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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the Internet has opened many opportunities for bankers to access new 
customers, increase convenience and expand product ranges in many markets, including that of 
small businesses.  Yet anecdotal evidence reveals that smaller banks are reluctant to employ 
Internet technology in the small business market for fear of damaging the customer relationship 
developed through personal contact.  These smaller, more simply structured banks tend to 
specialize in small business lending, possessing a comparative advantage in that market (Craig 
and Hardee, 2001).  This is particularly so in relationship driven credits where personal 
knowledge of the borrower is paramount over financial ratios produced through credit scoring 
models (Berger and Udell, 1995, 1994).  However, with technological advances, large banks 
have captured a greater share of the small business loan market (Ely and Robinson, 2001; Mester, 
1997).  Furthermore, large complex financial institutions have made greater inroads in 
establishing an Internet presence on the World Wide Web and have the most ambitious online 
banking agendas (Furst, Lang and Nolle, 2000).    
Within the financial services industry consolidations are ongoing and information 
technologies rapidly improve.  The result is much larger, complex banks participating more in 
small business lending (SBL) relative to the fewer small, simply structured ones—in contrast to 
what older evidence reveals (Ely and Robinson, 2001).  Consequently, the purpose of this paper 
is to determine if, with advanced technologies along with the changing face of the industry, bank 
structure continues to impact SBL; and if specifically Internet banking “levels the playing field” 
in that market.  We define an Internet bank as any commercial bank maintaining a World Wide 
Web site on which banking transactions may be conducted electronically.  These range from 
basic Internet services such as account inquiries to total financial management of a customer‟s 
assets. 
We base our analysis on a conceptual framework encompassing acute private information 
asymmetries inherent in small business borrowers.   Since these firms generally do not obtain 
financing from publicly traded securities markets, they produce little, if any, public information.  
Consequently, they are primarily dependent on bank financing as a source of external funds (Cole 
& Wolken, 1995; Elliehausen and Wolken, 1990).  The borrowing needs of small firms 
sometimes require a lender to possess a working knowledge of the business operations and/or an 
intrinsic feel for the character, integrity and productive potential of the firm‟s owner(s).  
Therefore, vis a vis large business loans the information asymmetry problem for small business 
borrowers is more acute.  Thus, private information becomes crucial in determining the credit 
worthiness of the firm.   
                                                          
  The authors wish to thank Sharon O’Donnell, University of Houston, for technical assistance on the 
data. 
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However, in a larger consolidated bank private information may be hampered by 
corporate governance.   That is, managerial diseconomies of scale may impede the flow of 
private information necessary to determine creditworthiness of the small firm (Nakamura, 1994). 
  For example, holding company or branching policies may result in inflexible loan procedures 
curtailing small business credit availability.   
Yet large more complex banking institutions are more diversified, both in terms of 
financial products and geographical markets. Their broader range of products and wider 
geographical exposure make them less likely to suffer from local economic shocks.   The 
diversity of their portfolio allows greater risk toleration.  Therefore, to the extent that small 
business loans are riskier than some other bank investments (such as large business loans or 
bonds), these more diversified financial institutions can withstand greater credit exposure to 
small firms, thereby potentially overcoming any ostensible comparative advantage inherent in 
small banks.  Furthermore, with the loss of some large business loans to commercial paper 
financing, the diversified banks are turning more to the small loan market (Mester, 1997).   
Since the Internet offers an additional avenue for banks to collect information generated 
by small business firms and their owners, its use as a remote delivery channel for banking 
services may help to mitigate informational asymmetries, regardless of bank structure.  
Additionally, to the extent the Internet expands geographical exposure and market access at a 
lower cost than physical branching, credit availability may be increased, particularly to price 
sensitive small firm borrowers.  However, a small firm‟s exclusive use of the Internet does not 
allow for personal contact which may be important for private information, particularly for 
unsecured loans relying on the character and productive capacity of the owner. 
Theory indicates that banks exist to overcome information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders in the financial intermediation process (Bernanke, 1993).   However, 
theory does not provide implications on optimal bank structures for overcoming the acute private 
information asymmetries inherent in small business loans (SBL).  Since conceptually there are 
reasons why the Internet may encourage or discourage SBL; and since consolidations among 
financial services firms are producing larger, more complex organizations; we empirically 
investigate the impact of bank structure and Internet technology on SBL.  We build on our 
previous SBL research (Craig and Hardee, 2001) not only by differentiating banks employing the 
Internet, but by updating and expanding our data.  Specifically, our sample extends beyond the 
Texas banks to include all banks in the United States.  We use more recent data in order to 
capture new information technology.  Furthermore we focus on more extensive organizational 
variables at the holding company level to more clearly account for consolidation effects. 
Our competing hypotheses are diversity provided by a large complex banking 
organization allowing its member banks to engage more in small business loans versus smaller, 
more simply structured banks having less hampered private information flows.  Since we find the 
behavior of rural and urban non-Internet banks statistically differ, and since we are unclear of the 
role of our competing hypotheses in Internet banks, we separately test the information versus 
diversity hypothesis on these three separate banking sectors--i.e. Internet, urban non-Internet and 
rural non-Internet banks.  
Our analysis proceeds in four sections.  In section two we provide a conceptual 
framework suggesting further how size, structure and other variables might affect a bank‟s ability 
for overcoming the acute private information asymmetries inherent in small business.  In section 
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three we describe the data, its sources and the research methodology employed in the data 
analysis.  In section four we present the empirical results.  Overall we find a domination of the 
information hypothesis, particularly in the rural non-Internet banks.   However, elements of 
diversity are reflected throughout all three sectors, implying that technological advancements are 
narrowing the comparative advantage of small more simply structured institutions.  Finally, our 
results show that Internet technology does not alter a bank‟s behavior significantly from urban 
banks in relation to SBL, and is a positive factor for rural banks on the World Wide Web.  
Section five contains our conclusion. 
 
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
There are two key conflicting aspects governing the extent to which a bank may engage in 
small business lending.  One is the ability of a bank to process private information inherent in 
SBL.  The other is the diversification of the bank improving its risk tolerance, thereby increasing 
its capacity to participate in SBL.  Our empirical work, therefore, seeks to explain SBL both as a 
function of the attributes that affect a bank‟s ability to process private information, and its 
diversification improving its ability to tolerate risk.   Our hypothesis is that large banks and those 
with complex structures will process private information less well but nonetheless will have a 
greater ability to diversify.  Small, simple banks may be able to better process private 
information, but clearly will not have the relative ability to diversify risk.  Regarding Internet 
banks, we are unclear as to the role of our competing hypotheses. On the one hand, Internet 
technology adds to the information pool and provides additional financial products, thus may 
increase SBL.  On the other hand, the strictly impersonal interaction of online banking may 
dampen the ability to build long-term customer relationships with small business firms. 
Empirically, if diversification is more important than private information in SBL, then the 
coefficients on most variables representing large complex banking structures ought to show more 
SBL activity.  If private information is more important, then we should find that the coefficients 
on most variables indicate smaller and simpler banking structures show a greater tendency for 
SBL.  Thus if the variables in our regressions successfully capture our ideas, diversity versus 
private information, we should see the coefficients are consistent in the results.  Comparisons can 
then be made between Internet and non-Internet urban and rural banks.  Our reduced form 
specification is: 
 
   SBL = f (BANK SIZE, HOLDING COMPANY ORGANIZATION, EXTENT OF BRANCHING, BANK AGE)  
 
The first three sets of variables--bank size, holding company organization and extent of 
branching--capture larger size and complexity of structure, thereby implying greater 
diversification; whereas small size and simplicity of structure imply better private information.   
Bank age is included to control for performance differences inherent in newly formed banks 
(Goldberg and DeYoung, 1999; Goldberg and White, 1998; Sullivan, 2000).  The state in which 
the bank is domiciled is also used in order to control for differences in market and operating 
conditions across state boundaries.  For similar reasons, an urban variable is employed in the 
Internet sector. 
 
2.1 Dependent Variables 
Our tests use three alternative measures of lending activity to illustrate the extent to 
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which the institutional variables described above alter banks‟ participation in a market that is 
presumably bank dependent for credit. Since approximately one-third of all the banks have 
business loans of $100,000 or less, and since large banks are increasing their presence in this 
category (Ely and Robinson, 2001), we use the natural log of SBL not exceeding $100,000 as our 
standard dependent variable [Ln (SBL100)]. 
The second measure of SBL activity in our view presents a clearer test of bank size as a 
determinant in our competing hypotheses.  Small banks may specialize in SBL because capital 
constraints limit these banks‟ participation in the large loan market.  The default of a large loan 
can render a small bank insolvent.  Thus, in our second measure we put capital constraints aside 
by disaggregating SBL into the difference between the natural log of small commercial and 
industrial (SCI) loans and small commercial real estate (SCRE) loans  [Ln (SCI/SCRE)].  This 
last distinction is particularly important, since assessing credit risk may be more difficult in SCI 
loans as compared to SCRE.  Real estate collateral is generally straightforward to appraise, 
improves loan liquidity, and allows for easier assessment of risk exposure.  Under conditions of 
stable or rising real estate prices SCRE loans require less monitoring.  So, real estate may be 
obtained as collateral perhaps to overcome information gaps; whereas SCI loans include 
unsecured loans, or monitor-intensive loans made in some cases solely on the character of the 
borrower.  Hence, they encompass relationship driven credits.  Thus, the more information 
sensitive subset of small business loans is SCI as opposed to SBL secured by commercial real 
estate.   
Our third way of measuring the dependent variable is to compare SBL to large business 
loans  (LBL), or business loans in excess of $100,000 produced in domestic banking offices
1
, 
while holding other bank assets constant.   We use the natural log of the ratio of these loans [ln 
SBL100/LBL)].  Again, as with our primary dependent variable, we perform a real estate test to 
remove the effects driven primarily by capital constraints.  We disaggregate our small business 
loans into the ratio of small C&I to small real estate secured business loans.   We do the same 
with the large loans.  We then put these in ratio form of a small to large real estate ratio.  The 
ratios are done in levels rather than logs to compensate for the nonlinear transformational effects. 
 Mathematically this ratio is the following form:  [small(C&I/ real estate)/large (C&I /real 
estate)]. 
  
2.2 Separate Regressions  
Statistically, Internet banks are not poolable with the universe of banks.  This, coupled 
with our uncertainty regarding the outcome of these banks under the diversity or information 
hypotheses, causes us to examine them separately.  The non-Internet banks are subdivided into 
urban and rural banks.  These two categories contain statistically different coefficients, therefore 
also require separate regressions. The dependent variables described above are thus applied 
separately to each banking sector, namely Internet, urban non-Internet and rural banks.
2
 
                                                          
1
Since small business loans are reported as those produced in domestic banking offices only, we 
use only large loans produced domestically.  However results from both domestic and foreign offices are 
qualitatively the same. 
2 
Our F test rejecting pooling is significant at the 1% level.  Additionally, across banking sectors, 
for coefficients of an independent variable having the same sign, we disclose if the difference is 
statistically significant.  Also, within the Internet sector, an F test revealed that the coefficients are not 
statistically different between urban and rural banks. 
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3.  DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION  
The unit of observation for our empirical analysis is at the bank level and includes all 
commercial banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  This 
encompasses all banks in the United States and a small number in protectorates.  Banks not 
having any business lending or which make only large business loans are eliminated.
3
  This 
results in approximately 9,000 banks with about 700 having transactional Web sites as of June 
30, 1999--the date of our data.  
Internet transactional Web sites
4
 allow customers at a minimum to make real-time queries 
about accounts, update account information, transfer funds, and make bill payments.  Some sites 
offer more services than others.  These include small business services such as loan applications 
and cash management.  No distinction of the level of services is in the data.
5
  
The data on small business loans are extracted from the 1999 bank Call Reports and is 
combined with the number of branch offices.  Holding company data are obtained from the 
Federal Reserve‟s Bank Holding Company Data file.6  
 There are four categories of loan size data available.  Data on business loans are 
categorized by dollar volume for $100,000 and less; $100,001 through $250,000; between 
$250,001 through $1,000,000, and over $1 million.  Although we define SBL as loans up to  
$100,000, and large business loans as greater than $100,000, the results for SBL defined to be $1 
million or less and large business loan greater than $1 million are qualitatively the same.  
We employ a semi-logarithmic OLS model in our empirical specification.
7
  Its general 
form is presented in the previous section, and captures the elements of diversity versus the 
information hypothesis with its vector of variables representing organizational size and 
complexity.  Each regression is a function of the specific independent variables described below. 
In accordance with the literature, BANK SIZE consists of the bank‟s total assets (TA).  
We use the natural log of TA [ln TA)], since empirically we find increasing marginal impact of 
TA on SBL.  In our regression using our primary dependent variable (LnSBL100), the coefficient 
                                                          
3 
Primarily, these are credit card banks having no business loans.  
4
The authors thank Cynthia Bonnette with the FDIC and Jim Bruene of Online Banking Report for 
supplying transactional Web sites as of November and September 2000 respectively; and Kelly Klemme 
of the Dallas Federal Reserve for providing individual bank’s Web URL addresses for June 30, 1999. 
5 
Little formal data about the universe of banking Web sites exist.  Most of the information 
gathered thus far has resulted from informal monitoring by banking regulators.   Additionally, the Web site 
of Online Banking Report edited by Jim Bruene appears to contain the most comprehensive listing of 
depository institutions’ transactional Web sites.  Two recent surveys by regulatory agencies analyze the 
Internet services offered by the banks under their aegis--nationally chartered banks (Furst, Lang and 
Nolle, 2000) and banks within the Tenth Federal Reserve District (Sullivan, 2000). 
 6 
The SBL data are reported annually at the end of the second quarter.  The data is relatively new, 
being originally reported in the 1993 June Call Report.  In order to avoid undue reporting burdens upon the 
banks, small businesses and farms are defined by the size of their original loan amount, rather than the 
size of the firm.  Size of the business rather than size of the loan is a preferred measure.  However, 
Scanlon (1984) has indicated that original loan size serves as a good proxy for borrower size.  All of the 
data was downloaded from separate files posted on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s World Wide 
Web site, www.chi.frb.org. 
7 
For reasons previously explained, the real estate regression of Table 4 does not utilize the 
logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable, thus is not truly a semi-logarithmic model. 
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estimate is elasticity.  Because this measures the bank‟s share of SBL as TA expands, we can 
ascertain if the proportion of TA invested in SBL is constant, falling or rising with increased 
bank size.  For instance, an inelastic estimate (less than one) implies the share of SBL is falling 
as a bank grows.  Consequently, we separately test if the estimate is statistically significantly 
different from one. 
The HOLDING COMPANY variables consist of a continuous variable (Lnbhcta) that 
reflects the natural log of the holding company assets (less the equity share of the bank‟s assets)8, 
as well as a series of dummy variables measuring different organizational characteristics.  Three 
dummy variables differentiate subsidiary banks from those with no holding company affiliation, 
the omitted category.  The first is the simplest holding company structure consisting of only one 
bank (Bhc1bank) with its parent company located within the state.  The second dummy variable 
represents a multibank holding company domiciled within the state of the individual member 
bank (Insmbhc).  The third is a bank belonging to a holding company domiciled outside of the 
state (Outsbhc) predominately containing multiple banks.
9
  Other dummy variables are 
Multilayer to account for tiered holding company relationships--i.e., a holding company owned 
by another holding company; and Pubtrade to designate if the holding company‟s stock is 
publicly traded in the securities market.  Finally, Majforgn represents banks which have a 
majority of foreign ownership, whether through its holding company or as a stand-alone bank. 
The extent of branching is defined by a dummy and a continuous variable. Branchbank is 
the dummy variable designation for banks with at least one banking office in addition to its main 
branch.   Unit banks, or banks without branches is the omitted variable.  In addition, we use the 
natural log of the number of bank branches (Lnofficenum) to account for the number of physical 
locations. 
The final group of variables accounts for an urban location on Internet banks, the bank 
age, and the state in which the main bank office is domiciled.  A dummy variable (Urban) equals 
one for Internet banks with main offices located in metropolitan statistical areas.  Lnbankage 
indicates the natural log of the age of a bank in years. In the state dummy variables, Texas is 
omitted. 
  Definitions of all the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 1, while 
Table 2 presents their mean and standard deviation of the variables.  Since many of the variables 
have been non-linearly transformed to the natural log, Table 2 also includes the levels and shares 
of relevant variables.
10
  
 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Overall our results are consistent with the information hypothesis, particularly with rural 
non-Internet banks, though elements of diversity are reflected throughout all three sectors.  
Additionally, Internet technology does not appear to significantly alter bank behavior from urban 
non-Internet banks in relation to small business lending, although its use does appear somewhat 
                                                          
8 
The equity share of the bank=s assets are removed from the size of the holding company to 
eliminate multi-colinearity with bank size.  This is particularly severe with one-bank holding companies, 
where the primary asset of the holding company is the bank. 
9 
In all holding company categories, in a tiered relationship, the domicile of the highest holding 
company is used. 
10 
State dummy variables are not included, but are furnished on request. 
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favorable for rural banks. 
 
The first set of triple columns in Table 3 presents our results of Internet as well as urban 
and rural non-Internet bank participation in the SBL sector, using the primary dependent variable 
(LnSBL100).  Results of the related real estate (RE) regressions are in the second set of triple 
columns for the respective sectors.  On the semi-logarithmic specifications, the coefficient 
estimates of continuous variables are elasticities.  Where the OLS regression errors are 
heteroscedastic (as determined by the White test), we report the robust errors as taken from the 
White heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix, although the outcome has no 
substantive differences from the original OLS results.  Table 4 presents results of small to large 
business lending in an analogous fashion, and pertinent findings are discussed with the results of 
Table 3. 
 
4.1.  Size Variables 
The size variable reveals mixed results of the two hypotheses.  Table 3 reflects that the 
coefficients on the LnSBL100 regressions are positive and significant, but inelastic, with values 
of .461, .467 and .826 in the Internets, urban and rural non-Internets respectively.  Additionally, 
these estimates are significantly less than one at the 1% level.  Because the coefficients are 
inelastic, this implies that small banks have a higher percentage of total assets in SBL than large 
banks.  That is, as banks grow larger, they are devoting less share of their assets to SBL, with the 
penalty for banks in the Internet and urban sectors being greater.  For example, as all banks 
increase assets by a factor of 10%, those in urban non-Internet and Internet sectors increase SBL 
lending by approximately 5%, while rural banks increase SBL by greater than 8%.
11
 These results 
support the information hypothesis--i.e.,  the disadvantage of a less personal touch in a large bank 
outweighs the advantage of diversity incumbent with size. 
Since some of this activity may be a function of capital constraints effectively limiting the 
participation of small banks to smaller loans, we look to the real estate regressions for a removal 
of these constraints. Here we see in Table 3 that diversity is the prevalent outcome in the Internet 
and urban non-Internet banks, with coefficients of .535 and .323, respectively.  As these banks 
grow larger they are participating more in the informational sensitive SBL over those secured by 
real estate.
12
  In contrast, rural banks are participating less in C&I loans as they grow larger--an 
outcome which supports the information hypothesis. 
The small to large business loan regressions (Table 4) reflect statistically significant 
negative coefficients in all three bank sectors respectively (-.489, -.573, -.316).
13
   This implies 
that as all banks grow, they are participating less in SBL than LBL (while holding the third asset 
pool constant), with the penalty of a lower allocation of assets to SBL being lighter in rural 
banks.  Although this outcome supports a dominance of information over diversity, it is strongly 
influenced by bank size, since large banks are not as constrained by the capital limitation on large 
                                                          
11 
A separate test on these coefficients reveals that this difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
12 
These two coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different at the 5% level.  That is, 
the urban banks are doing relatively more real estate lending.  Some of this may be attributed to more 
demand and supply of innovative C&I loan products in the Internet banks. 
13 
The rural bank coefficients are statistically significantly different from the Internets at the 5% 
level and the urban banks at the 1% level. 
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loans.  Therefore, again we look to the real estate regressions for clarification.  Here we see 
support for the information hypothesis with the negative and significant coefficient in the Internet 
banks (-77.3).  
 
4.2. Holding Company Variables 
In the LnSBL100 regression (Table 3), we also find a dominance of the information 
hypothesis in that the simplest holding company structure, the single in-state bank holding 
company, has positive and significant effect on SBL across all three banking sectors respectively 
(.689, .417, .307).  One-bank holding companies are formed to avail banks of profit opportunities 
more readily seized through the holding company organization.  Accordingly, in these simplest 
structures management may be more proactive in processing private information, giving rise to 
greater participation in the SBL market over no holding company banks.
14
  
In this same regression (Table 3), we find in the non-Internet banks significantly positive 
coefficients on banks owned by in-state multibank holding companies (.441, .270).  Although 
these are more complex organizations than the single bank holding company, the location of the 
corporate offices within the same state as the member bank may result in better information 
flows.  Accordingly, the out-of-state holding company variable (Outsbhc) has a significantly 
negative coefficient for the rural banks (-.359) in the real estate regression. Surprisingly, the size 
of the holding company (Lnbhcta) had generally a neutral effect. 
Again in Table 3, in the Internet banks the negative and significant results on the 
Multilayer variable (-.231), as well as the Pubtrade variable (-.180) in the rural banks, may 
suggest that additional holding company tiering or publicly traded stock adds to complexity, thus 
impeding information flows over and above the added diversity these variables may represent.   
However, in the RE regressions, public-traded urban and rural banks are making relatively more 
C&I loans.  Additionally, urban non-Internet banks do so as the size of their holding company 
increases (Lnbhcta, .027), though the value is highly inelastic.  These results are consistent with a 
dominance of the diversity hypothesis.  One explanation may be that public-traded and large 
bank holding companies offer more sophisticated C&I type products rather than unsecured 
relationship credits; for in C&I lending more product innovation may occur relative to 
commercial real estate credits.   However, testing this exceeds the limitation of our data. 
  Finally in banks with a majority of foreign ownership the -1.097 significant coefficient 
for the urban non-Internet banks in the LnSBL100 regression (Table 3) and in Table 4 the 
statistically significant -.814 Internet coefficient as well as the -.470 significant coefficient for 
urban banks in the small to large business loan regressions provide evidence of a domination of 
the information hypothesis.  That is, foreign ownership may not be as attuned to the local 
banking community.  Thus obtaining private information on small businesses may be more 
difficult for these institutions, resulting in SBL having a low priority.  Although we see positive 
results for these banks in the real estate regression, it is possible that this may be due more to the 
                                                          
14 
In the past these profit opportunities have been primarily related to tax advantages and/or 
financial services acquisitions.  Tax loopholes have since been removed. Additionally, under current 
banking regulations acquisitions can be done directly by the bank.  However, the mere formation of the 
holding company may proxy for more proactive management behavior.  Also, the difference in the 
coefficient values between the Internet and rural banks is statistically significant at the 5% level.  This may 
be a more proactive stance on the part of the Internet banks, as evidenced by this sector employing 
electronic technology. 
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nature of operations with foreign owned banks--i.e., providing more C&I type products such as 
drawings under letters of credit relating to international transactions or trade. 
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4.3.  Branching Variables 
The outcome on the branching variables in both Table 3 and Table 4 reveal that overall, 
banking offices are good for SBL.  While this supports diversity, it also augments private 
information. That is, personal contact may be an important determinant in the amount of small 
business loans.  Even though a bank has Internet capabilities, the participation in SBL increases 
with the number of brick and mortar locations.  This is consistent with a recent financial media 
program reporting some virtual Internet banks are constructing physical locations to appease 
preferences of customers and maintain relationships (Nightly Business Report, 2001).  We also 
find that branching is a positive determinant for SBL in the non-Internet banks, with coefficients 
on both the dummy and continuous variables being significantly positive in the LnSBL100 
regression (Table 3).
15
  In the small to large business loans (Table 4), as the number of offices 
increases there is relatively more SBL activity for both Internet and urban non-Internet banks. 
Thus the face-to-face people contact inherent in branch banking supports the information 
argument.  That is, valuable private information may be conveyed through the skill of the loan 
officer in determining the productive capacity as well as the character and integrity of the 
borrower.  This is especially important in extending unsecured loans.   
In sum, within the first set of triple columns for both Tables, the only indication that 
branching is not good for SBL is in Table 4, where the -.136 urban Branchbank coefficient is 
significant.  However, the .259 significantly positive coefficient on Lnofficenum has some 
offsetting effect.  That is, as the number of offices expands, the positive effects of a unit bank 
promoting information flows may be offset entirely.
16
 
The real estate regressions also bear out the strength of branching, though to a lesser 
extent.  In the Internet banks, the dummy variable coefficient is positive and significant (.521), 
indicating that branch banks make relatively more of the information sensitive loans as compared 
to unit banks.  However, as the number of offices increases, the significantly negative 
coefficients (-.499, -.224) imply a tendency for these banks as well as urban non-Internet banks to 
secure SBL by real estate.  Taken together, this may suggest that as the number of branches 
increase beyond some point, it may offset the positive effect of a branch bank in terms of 
information flows.  However, in the rural sector, unit banks make more of the informational 
sensitive loans, although beyond some point, it is beneficial to have more physical locations.  
Overall, the branching results support both diversity and information.  The additional 
branches add complexity, which implies diversity; but serve as an additional measure of face-to-
face contact, which may be important for information flows.  This is underscored in the Internet 
sector by the significantly positive coefficient of Lnofficenum.  If SBL could be efficiently 
produced exclusively through the Internet, this coefficient would be zero.   
                                                          
15 
The Internet banks’ coefficient of .344 is not statistically different from that of urban banks 
(.269), but both are significantly different from rural banks (.066) at the 1% level.  The fact that rural banks 
are highly inelastic vis a vis the other two sectors implies that while being a branch bank is an important 
determinant in the rural areas, expanding the number of offices does not greatly augment SBL. 
16 
The sign change between the dummy and continuous variable indicates it is important 
statistically to differentiate between a branch bank per se, and a branch bank with increasing branch 
locations. Utilizing the mean of the relevant variables, one can calculate the number of branches added to 
the mean value that offsets the opposite effect of the dummy variable.  The method for employing this is 
initially specified by Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980, and further refined by Kennedy, 1981. 
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4.4. Urban Internets, Bank Age 
In both tables, the significantly negative coefficients for the Urban variable in the Internet 
sector (-.182, -.217) support the information argument.  In the more  populated areas  where there 
is more density and flux, it may be more difficult to extract private information, thereby 
dampening SBL.  Furthermore, census data reflect the number of small businesses in urban areas 
is much higher than in rural markets (County Business Patterns, 1990), which should lead to a 
positive coefficient, if the demand effect dominates.  This negative result also bodes well for 
Internet technology in rural areas.  That is, these banks may be able to expand their SBL market 
exposure through the World Wide Web.In both the SBL and the small to large business loan 
regressions we find that older banks are participating more in small business loans.
17
  This may 
imply that as a bank ages, it accumulates more private information on its market, allowing it to 
engage more in SBL.  However, we do find in the real estate regressions that younger banks are 
engaging in the more information sensitive counterpart of SBL, perhaps due to a willingness to 
establish customer relationships in a younger, growth-oriented bank. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Technological improvements and consolidations continue in the banking industry.  Yet 
financial intermediation theory remains ambiguous as to the impact of bank structure and the 
Internet on small business lending. Thus, empirical examination is required.  Therefore this paper 
investigates whether small, simply structured banks are better at small business lending because 
of possible efficiencies in processing private information; whether large banks with more 
complex structure are better because of diversity allowing greater risk capacity to invest in SBL; 
and if Internet banking alters the role of these competing hypotheses. We find in our reduced 
form model that private information dominates over diversity as a determinant of SBL.  
However, elements of diversity are present, implying technology improvements may undermine 
small banks‟ comparative advantage.  We also find that Internet banks do not behave 
significantly different from urban banks operating without transactional Web sites, though there 
is some evidence that the Internet is a positive factor for SBL in rural banks. On a cautionary 
note, as of the date of this data research reflects that Internet usage was not widespread, and was 
confined primarily to consumer banking (Furst, Lang and Nolle, 2000; Couch and Parker, 2000). 
 Later research may point to different results as more small and more rural banks employ online 
technology geared towards small firms; and/or as larger, complex banks more aggressively 
attempt to capture new SBL customers via the Internet.   
Overall, the evidence from our reduced form model weighs toward better information 
flows in more simplistic structures, in contrast to diversity allowing for higher investment in 
SBL.  Despite this, there is a limit to the private information argument.   Banks without a holding 
company organization do not have higher SBL activity; size of the holding company is generally 
neutral in its effect; and branching is an important determinate in SBL.  This may indicate that 
                                                          
17 
This is opposite to the findings of previous research indicating new or “de nova” banks were 
filling any ostensible credit shortfall to SBL arising from consolidations (Goldberg and DeYoung, 1999; 
Goldberg and White, 1998).  However, in line with the previous research, SBL defined as one million and 
less (the definition of SBL in these prior studies) reflects a negative and significant relationship in the non-
Internet banks only for the primary dependent variable regressions.  The small to large ratio had similar 
results for both small business loan sizes. 
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some diversity is good for small business lending, but people contact is important as technology 
advancements allow more large bank participation.  Nevertheless in the face of consolidations, 
the results of this research imply that private information appears to be the more important 
motivation, with or without Internet banking.  
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Table 1: EXPLANATORY VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
 
RHS VARIABLES 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Size Variable 
 
 
 
LNTA 
 
the natural log of the bank‟s total assets 
 
Holding Company 
Variables 
 
The omitted variable is unaffiliated banks--i.e., banks without any 
holding company structure, or “No-Holding-Company-Banks” 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
a dummy variable for membership in a single bank holding 
company domiciled in the same state as the member bank 
 
Insmbhc 
 
a dummy variable for membership in a multibank holding company 
domiciled within the state of the member bank 
 
Outsbhc 
 
a dummy variable for membership in a bank holding company 
located outside the state of  the member bank 
 
Lnbhcta 
 
the natural log of (total assets of the highest holding company less 
the equity share*bank‟s assets)  
 
Multilayer 
 
a dummy variable for a tiered relationship in a bank holding 
company—i.e., multiple holding company levels   
 
Pubtrade 
 
a dummy variable a bank holding company whose equity shares are 
publically traded in the capital markets.  
 
Majforgn 
 
a dummy variable for over 50% foreign ownership at the holding 
company or bank level   
 
Branching Variables 
 
For the dummy variable, unit banks (banks having no branches) is 
the omitted variable 
 
Branchbank 
 
a dummy variable if the bank has at least one banking office in 
addition to its main location. 
 
Lnofficnum 
 
the natural log of number of branches of a particular bank 
 
Location, Age 
 
 
 
Urban 
 
a dummy variable equaling one for an urban location of the main 
office of the bank, zero otherwise 
 
Lnbankage 
 
the natural log of the time in years since the bank was chartered 
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 Table 1(con‟t): DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
 
 
LHS VARIABLES 
 
DEFINITION 
 
Ln SBL100 
 
the natural log of small business loans of $100,000 and less; and the 
primary dependent variable 
 
Ln (SCI/SCRE) 
 
the natural log of the ratio of small business C&I loans to small commercial 
real estate loans.  It is the allocation of small business loans of $100,000 
and less into the more information sensitive C&I loans versus the real 
estate secured counterpart 
 
Ln (SBL/LBL) 
 
the natural log of the ratio of small business loans of $100,000 and less to 
large business loans of greater than $100,000  
 
small (C&I/RE)/ 
large (C&I/RE) 
 
the ratio of small business C&I loans to small commercial real estate loans 
divided by the ratio of large business C&I loans to large commercial real 
estate loans.  This ratio is in levels rather than logs to compensate for the 
nonlinear transformational effects of a logarithmic specification. 
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TABLE 2:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
 
Internet Banks 
 
Urban non-Internet 
 
Rural non-Internet 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
Mean 
 
N 
 
Std 
Dev 
 
LnSBL100 
 
9.22 
 
689 
 
1.73 
 
8.37 
 
3685 
 
1.64 
 
8.30 
 
4699 
 
1.17 
 
Ln(SCI100/SCRE) 
 
1.15 
 
689 
 
1.80 
 
0.97 
 
3685 
 
2.14 
 
0.78 
 
4699 
 
1.64 
 
Ln(SBL100/LBL)
1
 
 
-1.78 
 
618 
 
1.02 
 
-1.73 
 
3070 
 
1.10 
 
-0.85 
 
2221 
 
0.81 
 
(small/large)CI/RE 
 
71.00 
 
618 
 
703.2 
 
43.22 
 
3070 
 
491.7 
 
20.01 
 
2221 
 
321.5 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LNTA 
 
1.74 
 
689 
 
12.71 
 
11.75 
 
3685 
 
1.35 
 
10.93 
 
4699 
 
0.92 
 
     Holding Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
0.44 
 
689 
 
0.50 
 
0.43 
 
3685 
 
0.49 
 
0.53 
 
4699 
 
0.50 
 
Insmbhc 
 
0.38 
 
689 
 
0.45 
 
0.18 
 
3685 
 
0.38 
 
0.23 
 
4699 
 
0.42 
 
Outsbhc 
 
0.11 
 
689 
 
0.31 
 
0.08 
 
3685 
 
0.27 
 
0.05 
 
4699 
 
0.21 
 
Lnbhcta 
 
8.83 
 
689 
 
5.82 
 
6.88 
 
3685 
 
5.72 
 
7.76 
 
4699 
 
4.52 
 
Multilay  
 
0.20 
 
689 
 
0.40 
 
0.13 
 
3685 
 
0.34 
 
0.10 
 
4699 
 
0.30 
 
Pubtrade 
 
0.39 
 
689 
 
0.49 
 
0.24 
 
3685 
 
0.43 
 
0.15 
 
4699 
 
0.36 
 
Majforgn--Bank 
 
0.03 
 
689 
 
0.16 
 
0.03 
 
3685 
 
0.16 
 
0.00 
 
4699 
 
0.03 
 
Branching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Branchbank 
 
0.91 
 
689 
 
0.28 
 
0.77 
 
3685 
 
0.42 
 
0.65 
 
4699 
 
0.48 
 
Lnofficenum 
 
2.14 
 
689 
 
1.42 
 
1.29 
 
3685 
 
1.11 
 
0.82 
 
4699 
 
0.78 
          
                                                          
1The number of banks decreases because banks without any large business loans (LBL) 
are dropped.  This applies across all three sectors. 
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Ln (Bank Age) 3.57 689 1.58 3.32 3685 1.61 4.10 4699 1.03 
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 TABLE 2(con‟t):  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS--Levels 
 
 
 
Internet Banks--
N=689 
 
Urban non-
Internet 
 
Rural non-
Internet 
 
Relevant 
Variables 
 
Mean 
N=689 
 
Share 
of 
Total  
 
Mean 
N=3685 
 
Share 
of 
Total  
 
Mean 
N=469
9 
 
Share 
of 
Total  
 
SBL100     
$000's 
 
45,206 
 
26.49
% 
 
14,286 
 
44.77
% 
 
7,193 
 
28.74% 
 
SCI100      
$000's 
 
34,970 
 
28.71
% 
 
10,660 
 
46.81
% 
 
4,370 
 
24.47% 
 
SCRE100   
$000's 
 
10,237 
 
20.94
% 
 
2,626 
 
39.67
% 
 
2,823 
 
39.39% 
 
LBL100     
$000's 
 
737,942 
 
40.75
% 
 
159,779 
 
54.99
% 
 
9,688 
 
4.25% 
 
C&I>100 
domestic 
 
437,279 
 
43.42
% 
 
101,576 
 
53.95
% 
 
3,885 
 
2.63% 
 
CRE>100 
domestic    
$000's 
 
195,969 
 
35.83
% 
 
58,223 
 
56.93
% 
 
5,803 
 
7.24% 
 
small CI/RE    
$ 
 
2,874 
 
44.43
% 
 
616 
 
50.94
% 
 
44 
 
4.62% 
 
large CI/RE    
 $ 
 
2,676 
 
27.70
% 
 
1,259 
 
69.73
% 
 
36 
 
2.57% 
 
SBL100/TA 
 
1.40% 
 
 
 
1.75% 
 
 
 
7.75% 
 
 
 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bank Size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TA            
$000's 
 
3,225,031 
 
39.18
% 
 
817,874 
 
53.14
% 
 
92,703 
 
7.68% 
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  Holding Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
N=300 
 
6.88% 
 
N=1572 
 
36.07
% 
 
N=248
6 
 
57.04% 
 
Insmbhc 
 
N=192 
 
9.94% 
 
N=661 
 
34.21
% 
 
N=107
9 
 
55.85% 
 
Outsbhc 
 
N=76 
 
12.71
% 
 
N=301 
 
50.33
% 
 
N=221 
 
36.96% 
 
BHCta
2
       
$000's 
 
14,360,81
9 
 
35.37
% 
 
4,100,18
0 
 
54.01
% 
 
632,21
2 
 
10.62% 
 
Multilayers  
 
N=135 
 
12.53
% 
 
N=477 
 
44.29
% 
 
465 
 
43.18% 
 
Pubtrade 
 
N=267 
 
14.48
% 
 
N=881 
 
47.78
% 
 
696 
 
37.74% 
 
Majforgn--
Bank 
 
N=18 
 
15.00
% 
 
N=99 
 
82.50
% 
 
3 
 
2.50% 
 
Branching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Branchbank 
 
N=630 
 
9.70% 
 
N=2832 
 
43.60
% 
 
N=303
3 
 
46.70% 
 
Office number 
 
43.25 
 
35.41
% 
 
10.52 
 
45.98
% 
 
3.33 
 
18.61% 
 
Bank Age 
 
64.65 
 
7.71% 
 
53.54 
 
32.80
% 
 
76.53 
 
59.79% 
 
                                                          
2Does not include the share of the bank’s total assets owned by the holding company. 
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 TABLE 3: Ln (SBL100) and Ln (SCI/SCRE) 
 
 
DependantVariables:  
 
Ln SBL100 
 
Ln SBL100 
 
RE  
 
RE  
 
RE  
 
 
 
INETS  
Ln(SBL100) 
 
No-INET 
URBAN 
 
No-INET 
RURAL 
 
INETS 
 
No-INET 
URBAN 
 
No-INET 
RURAL 
 
 
 
N=689 
R5=.658 
 
N=3685 
R5=.454 
 
N=4699 
R5=.569 
 
N=689 
R5=.658 
 
N=3685 
R5=.212 
 
N=4699 
R5=.116 
 
Independent 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Variable 
 
Std. Error 
 
Robust Err 
 
Robust Err 
 
Std. Err 
 
Robust Err 
 
Robust Err 
 
Intercept 
 
2.394 
.612*** 
 
2.287 
.439*** 
 
-1.0660 
.345*** 
 
-3.995 
.882*** 
 
-1.369 
.701*** 
 
3.813 
.484*** 
 
Lnta 
 
.461 
.057*** 
+ 
 
.467 
.041*** 
+ 
 
.826 
.032*** 
+ 
 
.535 
.082*** 
 
.323 
.067*** 
 
-.256 
.046*** 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
0.689 
.182*** 
 
.417 
.106*** 
 
.307 
.082*** 
 
-0.295 
.263 
 
0.185 
.127 
 
-0.079 
.130 
 
Insmbhc 
 
0.473 
.270 
 
0.441 
.166*** 
 
.270 
.115** 
 
-0.424 
.390 
 
-0.094 
.197 
 
-0.256 
.176 
 
Outsbhc 
 
0.492 
.336 
 
0.231 
.190 
 
0.139 
.135 
 
-0.312 
.484 
 
0.032 
.233 
 
-0.359 
.194* 
 
Lnbhcta 
 
-0.021 
.018 
 
-0.005 
.012 
 
-0.003 
.009 
 
0.032 
.026 
 
0.027 
.014** 
 
0.019 
.013 
 
Multilayer 
 
-.231 
.140* 
 
-0.059 
.072 
 
-0.008 
.039 
 
0.234 
.202 
 
-0.020 
.101 
 
0.113 
.072 
 
Pubtrade 
 
0.118 
.115 
 
-0.027 
.054 
 
-0.180 
.039*** 
 
0.033 
.165 
 
.361 
.086*** 
 
.169 
.074** 
 
Majforgn 
 
-0.135 
.302 
 
-1.097 
.215*** 
 
-0.107 
.406 
 
.991 
.435** 
 
.834 
.251*** 
 
-0.668 
.617 
 
Branchbank 
 
0.182 
 
.192 
 
.152 
 
.521 
 
0.021 
 
-.334 
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.179 .074*** .039*** .258** .113 .0781*** 
 
Lnofficenum 
 
.344 
.066*** 
 
.269 
.054*** 
 
.066 
.039* 
 
-.499 
.095*** 
 
-.224 
.082*** 
 
.252 
.061*** 
 
Urban 
 
-.182 
.111* 
 
 
 
 
 
0.146 
.159 
 
 
 
 
 
Lnbankage 
 
.099 
.035*** 
 
.114 
.020*** 
 
0.005 
.019 
 
-.420 
.051*** 
 
-.429 
.014*** 
 
-.065 
.029*** 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level 
State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported.  Results are furnished on request. 
+These estimates are inelastic, and are significantly less than 1 at the 1% level.  That is, the standard error*2.64 
+coefficient<1; (2.64 is the value of the t statistic at the 1% level). 
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 TABLE 4: Ln [(SBL100)/(LBL)] and [small(CI/CRE)/large(CI/CRE)] 
 
 
DependantVariables:  
 
Ln 
(SBL/LBL) 
 
Ln 
(SBL/LBL) 
 
RE  
 
RE  
 
RE  
 
 
 
INETS  
 
 
No-INET 
URBAN 
 
No-INET 
RURAL 
 
INETS 
 
No-INET 
URBAN 
 
No-INET 
RURAL 
 
 
 
N=618 
R5=.488 
 
N=3070 
R5=.318 
 
N=2221 
R5=.181 
 
N=618 
R5=.072 
 
N=3070 
R5=.029 
 
N=2221 
R5=.044 
 
Independent 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Coff.Est. 
 
Variable 
 
 Robust Err 
 
Robust Err 
 
Robust Err 
 
Std. Error 
 
Std. Error 
 
Std. Error 
 
Intercept 
 
3.807 
.694*** 
 
4.563 
.419*** 
 
2.449 
.344*** 
 
1029.00 
480.33** 
 
-86.446 
142.45 
 
221.161 
133.76* 
 
Lnta 
 
-.489 
.064*** 
 
-.573 
.039*** 
 
-.316 
.032*** 
 
-77.27 
44.83* 
 
14.028 
13.08 
 
-15.592 
12.67 
 
Bhc1bank 
 
0.063 
.122 
 
.074 
.077 
 
0.064 
.077 
 
-67.770 
129.48 
 
2.130 
35.66 
 
2.637 
36.26 
 
Insmbhc 
 
-0.032 
.173 
 
0.007 
.126 
 
-0.117 
.108 
 
-88.380 
191.77 
 
36.605 
57.71 
 
28.374 
51.72 
 
Outsbhc 
 
0.070 
.212 
 
-0.140 
.152 
 
-0.119 
.129 
 
-136.185 
237.04 
 
-16.109 
68.26 
 
-27.203 
60.52 
 
Lnbhcta 
 
-0.004 
.012 
 
0.004 
.009 
 
-0.004 
.007 
 
2.658 
12.67 
 
-0.782 
3.87 
 
-0.958 
3.74 
 
Multilayer 
 
0.175 
.100* 
 
0.001 
.063 
 
0.023 
.055 
 
30.380 
101.41 
 
3.811 
32.00 
 
78.509 
24.07*** 
 
Pubtrade 
 
0.090 
.076 
 
-0.010 
.044 
 
-0.024 
.045 
 
74.769 
81.35 
 
20.969 
26.27 
 
37.911 
1.86* 
 
Majforgn 
 
-0.814 
.255*** 
 
-.470 
.150*** 
 
-0.478 
.912 
 
52.284 
205.59 
 
-19.764 
56.33 
 
31.554 
320.35 
 
Branchbank 
 
0.076 
 
-.136 
 
-0.065 
 
-9.636 
 
24.646 
 
-27.436 
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.164 .063** .059 136.69 29.94 23.78 
 
Lnofficenum 
 
.222 
.067*** 
 
.259 
.046*** 
 
0.037 
.038 
 
67.398 
50.25 
 
-27.602 
17.10ms 
 
-1.077 
17.03 
 
Urban 
 
-.217 
.067*** 
 
 
 
 
 
-32.343 
81.50 
 
 
 
 
 
Lnbankage 
 
.115 
.026*** 
 
.189 
.010*** 
 
0.095 
.018*** 
 
-42.791 
25.91** 
 
-16.911 
6.86*** 
 
-17.485 
6.503*** 
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level 
State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported. Results are furnished on 
request. 
 
